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ABSTRACT

Exploratory Study of Construction Safety Culture Through Systems Thinking
by
Charles J. Benford Jr.
Dr. David Shields, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Construction Management
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Since its conception, in 1986 after the Chernobyl accident, the term “safety culture”
has gained major popularity throughout many systems, especially the construction
industry. Although this concept has gained much popularity over the course o f two
decades, it remains a heavily debated topic between advocates and skeptics for various
reasons. Much o f the skepticism is due to the failure o f proponents o f the concept to
clearly define and provide an understanding o f those factors that comprise what “safety
culture” is, and how it can be achieved. A system (particularly a construction system)
that possesses a safety culture is one in which safety is the first priority o f all individuals
involved from top-level management to those at the operational level including, but not
limited to owners, architects, engineers, general contractors, subcontractors, vendors,
workers, etc. Hence, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving
safety within systems.
System Dynamics, as defined by founder Jay Forrester, is the combination o f theory,
methods, and philosophy intended to analyze the behavior of systems in not only
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management, but also in environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine,
engineering, and other fields. The objective o f this thesis is to provide clarity to existing
research and literature which defines construction safety culture, and explain how System
Thinking/Dynamics is an effective tool for understanding and achieving a construction
safety culture in a complex system. The program Vensim is used to construct a visual
systems thinking model of causal loops that will ultimately provide a better
understanding o f construction safety culture. This model will illustrate the causal
relationships between various safety-related variables as they pertain to the construction
industry.
Keywords: Construction safety culture, systems thinking, safety
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
It is difficult to comprehend that with all the technological advances that have been
made in the industry, the number o f accidents that occur in construction remains higher
than those o f any other industry. Accidents resulting in injury and fatality have always
been a “black eye” for the construction industry. O f course, there has been some
improvement in regards to safety in construction. There has been a slight decrease in the
number o f incidents reported over the past few years, but in comparison to other
industries the numbers remain disturbing to researchers and safety professionals. Who is
to blame for these safety mishaps? Much o f the research that has been collected on
construction safety concentrates on the number o f accidents that have occurred in a
certain time period, and then researchers, as well as policymakers, attempt to use these
data to somehow achieve what “they” believe to be safety. At this point, the damage has
been done. These data do provide valuable information; however, it is my belief that this
approach does not achieve the ultimate goal, but only serves well as a numerical
representation o f a problem that has scarred this industry for much too long. Reactive

measures are not the solution to achieving safety in complex systems. Safety cannot wait
to be emphasized. It must be embedded and practiced at all times throughout the entire
construction organization from the highest executive down to the operatives, and must be
I

continuously observed, measured, and improved as required. “The only way o f knowing
if safety really exists is to measure it and as the saying goes— if you don’t keep score you
are only practicing” (Ahmad & Gihb, 2004). Construction safety must exist within an
organization like a culture or a way o f life. Culture generally refers to patterns o f human
activity and the symbolic structures that give such activities significance and importance.
In a system, culture is the set o f shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that
characterizes an institution or organization.

1.2 Why Study Construction Safety?
Construction is one o f the largest industries in the United States. The U.S Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2007) states that in 2006 there were 7.7 million wage and salary
workers, and another 1.9 million self-employed individuals working in the construction
industry. The number o f workers in the construction industry continues to grow, hut it is
fair to say that safety awareness and zero-accident philosophy, unfortunately, has not
experienced the same growth. Much o f the industry’s growth can be attributed to the
financial gains that can be achieved in most sectors o f construction. Despite the known
dangers and health-related risks associated with construction work, individuals are
attracted to the relatively high hourly earnings that can he attained in the field. In 2006,
the average wage o f a construction worker who did not hold a supervisory position was
$20.02 an hour. You would think that an industry that has the ability to pay this type of
money to its operatives would have the necessary finances to ensure a safe working
environment, hut it doesn’t. The wage partly is a compensating differential for the
danger; many insured contractors probably find self-insurance better than accident

prevention. It is easy to blame the employers, but workers are just as much responsible
for the accident rates that plague the industry. Safety seems to be no more o f a priority o f
workers than it does employers. The problem is that the industry prioritizes production
and profit, not safety. Historically, construction related fatalities have accounted for
nearly 17-20% o f all occupational related deaths (Hill, 2004). In 2006, the death rate for
construction was 11.1 per 100,000 full-time workers, nearly three times the average rate
of 4.2 per 100,000 full-time workers for all industries (CPWR, 2007). Figure 1 compares
fatal occupational injuries for construction and other industries based on U.S Bureau of
Labor Statistics data.
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Figure 1. Number and rate o f fatal occupational injuries by industry sector
(CPWR, 2007).

This is the highest number reported by any other occupation. The Center for
Construction Research and Training (formerly the Centers to Protect W orkers’ Rights),
which is a non-profit organization created by the Building and Construction Trades
Department o f the AFL-CIO to perform research and training on construction safety,
investigated the leading causes o f death in the construction from 1992 through 2005 and
their findings were as follows (in rank order): the highest ranking causes o f work-related
deaths were falls to a lower level, highway incidents (motor vehicle related crashes),
being struck by falling objects, and contact with electric current (a subcategory o f
exposure to harmful substances or environments). The distribution of leading causes of
death are shown in Figure 2.

Other, 6 ,2 %
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Exposure, 13.5%

Contact with
object, 2 0 .0 %

Figure 2.

Transportation,
28 .4 %

The distribution o f leading causes o f death from injuries in
construction from 1992 to 2005 (CPWR, 2007).

The Center for Construction Research and Training (CPWR) (formerly the Center to
Protect W orkers’ Rights), also provides a breakdown, by occupation, o f work-related
fatalities sustained in 2007. Figure 3 illustrates their findings.
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Figure 3.

Fatal occupational injuries by occupation and selected event o f
exposure, (CPWR, 2007)

It is important to note that these figures represent just the fatalities that have occurred
in the construction industry. The numbers for injuries sustained in the construction field
present an even more alarming representation of the safety concerns in the industry.
Thus, one o f the most important reasons for research in this area o f study is that safety
typically has an effect on every aspect or phase o f any complex system or organization.
In the construction industry, safety impacts design and planning, bidding, scheduling,
construction, costs, overhead, etc. Safety impacts productivity, efficiency, and ,
constructability. There is no operation or system that may exist without taking safety into
consideration, and its due attention is critical to the functioning o f all systems.
Safety is one o f those topics that is frequently taken for granted. It is often assumed
that some other individual has been given the responsibility o f taking safety into
consideration at any given point o f a construction process. For example, it is often
assumed that the architect has taken into consideration the possible hazards that may
occur as a result o f the complexity o f his/her design. It is assumed that safety personnel
are performing “walk-arounds” to recognize potential hazards. It is important for safety
to exist not only as a priority in the construction industry, but as a culture just as the
concepts of productivity and profitability exist in the industry. The objectives o f this
research thesis are: (1) define construction safety culture in its’ entirety from conception
to present day, (2) effectively explain the discipline o f systems thinking and contributing
factors such as modeling and simulation, and (3) explain how systems thinking is an
effective tool for building a construction safety culture. Finally, this research will
demonstrate that if organizations (including all levels) adopt and remain committed to the
system thinking approach to construction safety culture the industry’s ultimate goal of

reducing injuries and fatalities at construction sites can and will be accomplished.

1.3 Costs o f Accidents in the Construction Industry
Although their approaches to safety are reactive in nature, many organizations are
finally emphasizing the prioritization o f safety culture within their systems because o f the
extreme financial burdens of accidents and injuries. In fact, the cost o f accidents is
frequently cited by organizations as a major motivation for addressing health and safety
(Hinze, 1996). This fact is unfortunate, but very true. It makes the assumption that if it
would not be for the extremely high costs o f construction accidents, then organizations
would not place an emphasis on safety. There are two types o f costs related to
construction accidents: direct cost and indirect costs. Direct costs are those costs incurred
directly as a result o f medical costs and loss o f wages from injuries. Indirect costs are all
other costs incurred as a result o f an accident such as: fines, lawsuits, damaged
equipment, production delays, etc. In a study performed by Tang et al. (1997) many of
the financial costs as a result o f accidents were identified including:
•

Loss due to the injured worker.
The compensation paid to the worker by the contractor is two-thirds o f the
wage o f the injured person for each day o f absence from work.
Disability compensation, which depends on the percentage o f disability
that the injured worker suffers.

•

Loss due to the inefficiency o f the worker who has just recovered from injury
upon resuming work.

When an injured person returns to work, he or she cannot initially work
with 100% efficiency.
•

Loss due to medical expenses.
Medical expenses o f the injured worker, including the cost o f transport to
the hospital.

•

Loss due to fines and legal expenses.
-

If the contractor faces prosecution, he may have to pay damages and fines
imposed by the court.

• Loss o f productivity o f other employees.
The safety officer, site workers, project engineer, and foremen may be
involved in assisting the injured and carrying out works related to the
accident such as accident investigation and report writing.
Other workers may have to stop immediately after the occurrence o f the
Accident.
• Loss due to damaged equipment.
• Loss due to damaged material or finished work.
• Loss due to idle machinery or equipment.
After an accident has occurred, the workers may stop work temporarily
and hence there will be idle machinery or equipment.
According to the CPWR, the total costs o f fatal and nonfatal injures in the
construction industry is estimated at nearly $13 billion annually (CPWR, 2007).
Construction workers experienced 414,900 injury and illness cases in 2005, o f which
157,100 cases were serious enough to require days away from work - lost workday cases

8

-about 628 per workday. Illnesses are less than 2.5% o f the total in construction, so the
numbers for construction essentially show injuries. Compared with other industries, the
construction industry had the second highest rate o f 239.5 per 10,000 full-time workers in
2005 (manufacturing industry has the highest rate), about 76% higher than the average
rate o f 135.7 per 10,000 full-time workers for all private industries. Overall, the rate of
work-related deaths in construction declined gradually from 14.3 to 11.1 per 100,000
full-time workers from 1992 to 2005, while the rate o f serious nonfatal injuries and
illnesses dropped significantly by 55% from 529.5 to 239.5 per 10,000 full-time workers
during this period. The rates o f work-related deaths in construction are not as high as in
agriculture and mining, but the rates o f nonfatal injuries and illnesses in construction
exceeded that for other goods-producing industries over time. Deaths are estimated to be
40% of the total, and nonfatal injuries and illnesses represent the other 60% o f the total
costs. Their research states that the death o f a construction work on a project results in a
valued loss o f $4 million, while nonfatal injuries usually average about $42,000 per
occurrence. These estimates include direct and indirect costs, and quality-of-life costs.
Construction laborers and carpenters ranked the highest in cost for both nonfatal and fatal
injuries, and the top five construction industries, which accounted for over half o f the
fatal and nonfatal injury costs included: miscellaneous specialty trade contractors;
plumbing, heating, and air conditioning; electrical work; heavy construction except
highway; and residential building construction (CPWR, 2007). Figures 4 through 6
represent their findings.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Defining Construction Safety Culture
The term ‘safety culture’ first made its appearance in the 1987 Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear agency report on the 1986
Chernobyl disaster (Mohamed, 2003). On April 26, 1986 two explosions blew o ff the
1000 ton cap sealing the Chernobyl 4 reactor releasing molten core fragments into the
vicinity. It was the worst accident in the history o f commercial nuclear power generation
costing more than 30 lives, contaminating over 400 square miles and increased the
number o f cancer related deaths in Western Europe (Reason, 1990). Since its birth the
philosophy has gained much popularity throughout many systems, especially within the
construction industry, that view safety as their first priority. The Chernobyl report stated
that it was a “poor safety culture” that caused this catastrophe. There are many factors
which contribute to a “good” construction safety culture. Since safety culture is such a
broad concept it has been met with much criticism which generally stems from the
various definitions that lack precision. Some critics o f the safety culture paradigm
consider it to be a fad (Woolfson, 1999), and others refer to it as a ‘catch-all’ for human
factors issues and concept without substance (Cox and Flin, 1998). Also, the failure o f
researchers to establish means o f quantifying the concept o f construction safety culture
has led negativist to bash its existence. System dynamics which will be addressed later
11

will dispute the quantification issue. Admittedly, there are various definitions of
construction safety culture that has led to skepticism, but it is a concept that can exist
within organizations. Many critics negate safety culture because it is not a “one size fits
all” approach to safety for all organizations. This does not mean that a safety culture
cannot be created; however, it does indicate that safety culture can be achieved in various
ways and the means o f accomplishing is unique between systems. Hence, in regards to
safety programs, what works for one organization may not work for others. Zhang et al.
(2002) states that safety culture is comprised o f the following factors:
•

Safety culture is a concept defined at group level or higher, which refers to the
shared values among all the group or organization members.

•

Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and
closely related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems.

•

Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level o f an
organization.

•

The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ behavior at
work.

•

Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward system and
safety performance.

•

Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and learn
from errors, incidents, and accidents.

• Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change.
The Advisory Committee on the Safety o f Nuclear Installations (ACSNl, 1993)
produced one o f the most quoted definitions o f safety culture to date. ACSNl defines
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safety culture as the product o f individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns o f behavior that determine the commitment to, and the
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management. What makes
construction safety culture unique from all other approaches to reducing accidents is that
it takes a top-down approach to achieving safety within systems. “The safety culture
paradigm constitutes a holistic way o f thinking about health and safety risk management
to reveal underlying factors affecting safety performance in complex systems” (Peckitt et.
al, 2004). This means that safety should not be the sole responsibility o f individuals at
the operational level; it should be the priority o f all parties involved including the client,
architects, designers, subcontractors, vendors, etc. (Baxendale and Jones, 2003). The topdown approach includes observable measures such as management commitment,
participation and accountability, procedures and policies, communication, etc (Mohamed,
2004).
As expressed in this thesis, the factor o f management’s commitment to the
construction safety culture is the most important factor necessary for its existence. There
is much research that identifies management’s lack o f commitment to safety as one o f the
key factors contributing to construction accidents. Management is the key that allows
safety performance improvements to occur in organizations (Freda et. al, 1999).
Management must also establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement
systems. Without a reporting system, there is no way to measure and assess the state o f
the system’s safety. The objective o f the reporting system is to not only monitor accident
rates, but to identify accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect o f site safety
initiatives, and to estimate the costs o f accidents (Rowlinson, 2004). A safety reporting
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system is another activity that requires continuous, active participation o f all members
within an organization from top level management to the operational level. Ahmad and
Gibb (2004) state that measurement will enable comparison, benchmark performance,
and track progress over time. System dynamics will provide a means for all factors
associated with construction safety culture to be measured over time to reveal valuable
information about the status o f an organization’s safety program.

2.2 Systems Thinking and System Dynamics
Systems thinking can be as a concept or idea, as an approach or study, or as a tool to
create a better understanding. The objective o f systems thinking is very “cut and dry”—to
provide a clear understanding to eomplex, real world problems and situations by
examining systems holistically. Systems thinking, as defined by Sherwood (2002), is the
study o f the connectedness between those systems’ component parts whether they be
human beings, departments, or indeed businesses and organizations, as a whole.
“Systems thinking is a powerful approach for understanding the nature o f why situations
are the way they are, and how to go about improving results” (Bellinger, 2004). Systems
thinking is not an easy approach because it involves a significant amount o f time, effort,
and thought. Creating causal loop diagrams is the foundation upon which systems
thinking is built. “Causal loop diagrams provide a language for articulating our
understanding of the dynamic, interconnected nature o f our world” (Kim, 1994). The
causal loop diagrams provide researchers with a visual or mental model o f factors that
may be occurring in a complex system or organization. What makes systems thinking
ideal is that it addresses problems events, etc. that occur in a system in a holistic
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approach. As humans, when solving problems it is part o f our instinctual abilities to
dissect problems into smaller subparts in an attempt to gain insight and understanding of
that system. However, when we do this we often solve problems that are unassociated
with the initial one that we wanted to solve or miss our goals altogether. There are many
reasons for using the systems thinking approach to studying complex systems as
described by Belinger (2004);
•

Often previous fixes seem to overshoot the goal

•

Previous fixes has created problems elsewhere

•

After a fix is applied the problem returns in time

•

The same fixes are usually repeated

•

There is a tendency to allow an established standard to slip

Once the causal loop diagrams have been constructed into mental models o f all that is
occurring in the system the variable can be given mathematical computations to perform
system dynamics modeling and simulation.
Jay Forrester, founder o f system dynamics, defines it as the combination o f theory,
methods, and philosophy that is needed to analyze the behavior of systems in not only
management, but also in environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine,
engineering, and other fields. System dynamics takes the concepts from causal or
feedback loops and organizes the information into computer simulated models.
Examples o f these feedback or causal loops are in the appendix o f this paper. The first
articles based on system dynamics appeared in the Harvard Business Review (Forrester,
1958). These computer simulations anticipate the behavior and actions o f a system and
provide researchers with valuable information o f how certain situations would occur
given the presence of certain behaviors, variables, stimuli, etc. Regardless o f the type or
15

format of the simulation, the overriding purpose for simulating systems remains: to
provide a learning environment that supports the learner to develop mental models about
the interrelationships of variables; to test the efficacy of these models in explaining or
predicting events in a system; and to discover relationships among variables and/or
confronting misconceptions (Milrad, 2002). The concept o f system dynamics implies
that individuals within a system do not make decisions or actions solely on their own;
their decisions are motivated and driven by other factors within the system. In laymen’s
terms “every action causes a reaction.” The discipline is known for its’ representation of
causal loops for the behavior. Forrester (1991) states that “we live in an on-going
circular environment in which each action is based on current conditions, such actions
affect conditions, and the changed condition becomes the basis for future action; there is
no beginning or end to the process.” As for construction which will be addressed later in
the paper, system dynamics will not only examine individual causes o f why a safety error
occurred, but most importantly why the system failed. The system dynamics approach
will illustrate how the actual error may have begun as far as the top level management
within the system. For example, a single accident although it may be linked to human
error may have ultimately been caused by the management’s lack of commitment to
safety or training. “System dynamics models organize, clarify, and unify knowledge that
have previously caused confusion within a system and changes the way people think
about that system by building on the reliable part o f our understanding and compensating
for the unreliable part” (Forrester, 1991).
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2.3 Achieving a Safety Culture Using System Dynamics
The outrageous number o f accidents in the construction industry has led many
researchers to develop new measures to combat this problem. Researchers believed that
prior methods o f measuring accidents after they occurred and then implementing safety
regulations and guidelines (a reactive approach) only achieved temporary success as far
as safety was concerned. In response, researchers and construction safety culture
advocates have begun using system dynamics, which involves modeling and simulation,
to create safety management systems that will yield greater success. “The safety system
label term encompasses all aspects o f the organization’s safety management system
including safety policies, procedures, committees, etc. and provides a systematic process
for planning, implementing, monitoring, and reviewing safety performance” (Choudhury
et al., 2007). Figure 7 presents a representation o f Choudhury et al. (2007) elements of
the safety system model.
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Figure 7.

Basic elements o f safety management system model (Choudhury et al.,
2007)

Mohamed (2004) states that the fundamental principle on which safety management
systems are based is that all project participants (clients, architects, designers,
subcontractors, etc.) who contribute to safety on a project must be included in
considering safety issues systematically, stage by stage, from the outset o f the project.
His research model emphasizes the top-down approach to addressing safety in
organizations. Systems thinking/dynamics is compatible with safety culture for one main
reason: the top-down approach o f safety culture implies that all levels or aspects o f a
system will be incorporated into the problem solving technique and this holistic approach
is shared with systems thinking and systems dynamics. Figure 8 presents this top-down
approach to safety.
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Figure 8.

Safety management system for strategic and operational
implementation (Mohamed, 2004)

System dynamics appears to be an appropriate methodology for demonstrating safety
culture through mental modeling in the construction industry, as well as any occupation.
For example, system dynamics was used to determine the cause o f the Chernobyl
accident that was mentioned in the introduction. In the study by Salge and Milling
(2006), two stages o f human failure were investigated by two separate system dynamics
models including (1) the design o f the reactor and (2) on-line operations. The system
dynamics analyses indicate that the accident was caused by the combination o f the
specific reactor characteristics and infringements on safety rules which had previously
not caused accidents, but led to more violations o f safety rules and ultimately caused the
Chernobyl accident (Salge and Miller, 2006). Reason (1990) suggests that “systems
accidents have their primary origins in latent failures committed by designers and other
high-level decision makers which typically become apparent due to certain unsafe acts
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committed by operators.” Dulac et. al (2005) states that “while reduction in safety efforts
and lower prioritization o f safety concerns may lead to accidents, accidents usually do not
occur for a considerable time period (years) so false confidence is created that the
reductions are having no impact on safety and therefore pressures increase to reduce
safety efforts and priority even further as the external performance pressures mount.” An
example o f these latent failures in the construction industry may be the impact o f
productivity pressure by upper management on the workers o f a project.
When pressure is placed on employees to achieve higher production rates, workers
tend to neglect certain measures, generally safety, in an effort to cut time during certain
activities. For example the fall o f worker as a result o f his/her failure to “tie-off,” o f
course, at the individual level is viewed as human error, but system dynamics provides
deeper understanding of how multiple variables such as management’s lack of
commitment to regulation enforcement may have contributed to the fall. Again, system
dynamics uses a top-down approach to analyzing safety.
In developing system dynamics modeling for construction safety, literature covering
research on the 1986 space shuttle Challenger incident was also examined. In one study,
Cooke and Rohleder (2006) developed an organizational response system called incident
learning in which normal precursor incidents are used in a learning process to combat
complacency and avoid larger disasters such as the Challenger incident. Their system
dynamics model, presented in Figure 9, provided valuable, latent information to the
causes of the Challenger incident.
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Figure 9.

Systems thinking model o f the incident learning system (Cooke and

Rohleder, 2006)

The goal o f their model was to motivate managers to implement learning systems that
will achieve more reliable safety performance. Using system dynamics in the shuttle
disaster cited the ultimate cause to be “the inability o f the organization involved to
effectively synthesize and share the information from separate precursor incidents with
the relevant people across the organization so that appropriate action could be taken to
reduce the risk o f disaster” ( Cooke and Rohdeler, 2006). The incident learning system
constructed by Cooke and Rohdeler allows for the reporting, recording, and
communication o f information involving minor incidents to improve safety performance
over time which will, in turn, prevent major disasters. Similar research incorporating
system dynamics to accident causation was used in the Westray mining disaster by Cooke
(2003). In this model, such factors as management commitment to safety, worker
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training, and productivity revealed valuable information on what contributed to the
disaster. This model is presented in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Systems thinking model o f the Westray mine disaster (Cooke, 2003)

Other research which incorporates system dynamics with construction safety focuses
on construction accident causation. This literature focuses on “how the characteristics of
the production system generate hazardous situations and shape the work behaviors and
analyzes the conditions that trigger the release o f the hazards. The model identifies the
need for two accident prevention strategies: (1) reliable production planning to reduce
task unpredictability, and( 2) error management to increase worker’s ability to avoid
error” (Mitropoulos et ah, 2005). There have been various models constructed on safety
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which have identified various factors and causes contributing to accidents. McClay
(1989) presented his “universal framework” which identified hazards, human actions, and
functional limitations to be the key elements o f accidents. Hinze’s distraction theory
cited that the distraction o f workers from hazards and potential accidents was due to
production pressures (Hinze, 1996). Management deficiencies, training, and workers
attitudes were identified as key elements in accidents in Abdelhamid and Everett (2000).
There is research as early as Levitt (1975) which targets top management’s attitude (or
lack thereof) toward safety as an underlying factor in accident causation. Toole (2002)
identified various root causes o f accidents: lack o f proper training, safety equipment not
provided, deficient enforcement o f safety, unsafe equipment, method, or condition, poor
safety attitude, and isolated deviation from prescribed behavior. It is evident that there
has been much research performed on modeling construction safety. One downfall o f
some, not all, systems approaches to construction safety is that they only focus on
reducing the risks, but fail to increase the safety effort (Mitropoulus et ah, 2005). “Safety
efforts to control workers’ behaviors reduce exposures to hazards” (Mitroupolus et ah,
2005). This research thesis will construct a systems thinking model that will incorporate
various factors required to achieve a safety culture in the construction industry.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Variable Identification
As previously stated, the concept o f construction safety culture has gained popularity
over the course o f two decades since the Chernobyl disaster. However, the concept
remains at the center o f debates because o f the failure o f many advocates to provide an
explicit understanding of what it actually is and how this “culture” may be achieved. One
tool that has shed light on this issue is the application o f systems thinking to construction
safety culture. Systems thinking investigates complex problems by determining causal
relationships between a system’s factors. It is the ultimate goal o f this thesis to
demonstrate the usefulness o f systems thinking as a tool in hopes that organizations will
use the systems thinking approach to establish or re-establish a safety culture within their
system.

3.2 Management Commitment
The first step in the application o f the systems thinking approach to construction
safety culture is variable identification. This step involves indentifying and defining

those variables or factors that are most valuable to the existence o f a safety culture.
Identifying all relevant factors is the prerequisite to construction o f the system model. As
mentioned before, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving safety
24

within the system. Therefore, our analysis must focus on what is believed to be the most
important factor in safety culture— management’s commitment to safety.
Management’s commitment to safety is the most important factor necessary to
achieving a safety culture. Most research performed on safety has identified
management’s lack o f commitment to safety as the root cause o f accidents in various
industries, specifically construction. In system dynamics modeling, management
commitment can be measured as the level o f commitment o f management, as perceived
by workers, to the safety program or safety culture of their organization. This
information may be obtained by administering surveys, questionnaires, or interviews.
The individuals being interviewed will be asked to rate using the Likert scale (1-5 with 5
being the highest) management’s level o f commitment to safety in the organization. It
cannot be expected o f individuals at the operative level to keep safety as their first
priority if management has a lax commitment to it. Management is the key that allows
safety performance improvements to occur in organizations (Freda et ah, 1999). Safety is
a social construct which means that the behaviors and attitudes that individuals develop
towards it is learned and/or influenced by others in the environment. Therefore, “health
and safety management is primarily dependent upon the occupational risk-related
attitudes and behaviors o f directors, managers, and workers who are part o f the
organization and wider society (Peckitt et ah, 2004). Management’s involvement in
safety must go beyond constructing a set o f rules and policies for individuals to follow at
their own discretion. Management’s commitment to construction safety culture cannot be
overemphasized— the existence o f this factor in the systems thinking application is
crucial to the overall success o f the model. Therefore, one can conclude that commitment
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is a prerequisite to creating and sustaining a positive safety culture in construction site
environments (Mohamed, 2004). The systems thinking application to construction
safety culture requires that all individuals that make up a system change the way they
view safety in that environment. Change in any environment or situation is typically
difficult to accomplish. For whatever reasons, people often resist change because they
have grown accustomed to performing in a manner that is routine. Often, it is hilarious to
see or hear construction organizations preach safety as their first priority, but begin
toolbox meetings discussing increased productivity, cost control, etc. It may be difficult
for an organization which has previously prioritized profit and production to make a shift
to safety as the central focus. However, when upper management ‘buys in’ to these
changes, it ensures success (Petersen, 1998). The degree to which upper level
management becomes involved in the safety culture o f the organization is directly
proportional to the ultimate success. Diamond (1998) states that organizational change
demands executive commitment and investment that is cognitive, emotional, and
financial. The shift to a construction safety culture requires that managers and
supervisors “set the tone” by leading by the examples they set forth. Freda et al. (1999)
states, “major change is impossible unless the upper management o f construction firms
actively and demonstrably supports and understands the needs for the changes they
introduce.” The requisite changes to achieve a construction safety culture must not only
include a commitment that is cognitive, emotional, and financial as suggested by
Diamond (1998), but it must also include a commitment that is recognizable by all
individuals within that system.
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3.3 Training
Another main factor that is detrimental to the existence and maintenance of
construction safety culture is a thorough safety training program. Rowlinson (2004)
identifies three basic types o f training required including: (1) induction training which
focuses on the worker that is new to the construction site and introduces basic safety
awareness; (2) refresher training which is aimed at those workers who have been in the
construction business for a length o f time and introduces them to the current and
innovative methods and practices; and (3) ongoing training which addresses the need for
continuous training and education on various safety procedures. In system dynamics
modeling, training can be measured as the total amount o f hours per year an organization
requires training for their employees, including: induction training, refresher training, and
ongoing training. Many construction accidents occur because workers lack adequate
safety training— this means that they are either unknowledgeable or incompetent on the
current safe practices and/or lack the ability to recognize potential hazards before they
occur. “Formal safety training has proven to be the most effective and successful way to
ensure that workers possess the knowledge required to perform tasks in a safe manner”
(Fiori, 2004).
The Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed in 1970 to establish a universal,
government regulated standard for safety for all industries in the United States with an
ultimate objective o f creating a safe working environment for all individuals. Out o f this
act. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was established. One
o f the key components of OSHA is that it places the responsibility o f safety on the
employers and/or management o f companies. Thus, reiterating the importance of

27

management commitment to a safety culture within an organization. OSHA’s section
1926.21 or 29 CFR is dedicated to the responsibility o f employers and managers for
providing safety training and education within the construction industry. The standards
are as follows;
Regulaions (Standards - 29 CFR)
Safety training and education. - 1926.21
Part Number: 1926
Part Title: Safety and Health Regulations for Construction
Subpart: C

1926.21(a)
General requirements. The Secretary shall, pursuant to section 107(f) o f the Act,
establish and supervise programs for the education and training o f employers and
employees in the recognition, avoidance and prevention o f unsafe conditions in
employments covered by the act.

1926.21(b)
Employer responsibility.

1926.21(b)(1)
The employer should avail him self o f the safety and health training programs the
Secretary provides.

1926.21(b)(2)
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The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance o f unsafe
conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate
any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury.

1926.21(b)(3)
Employees required to handle or use poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances
shall be instructed regarding the safe handling and use, and be made aware o f the
potential hazards, personal hygiene, and personal protective measures required.

1926.21(b)(4)
In job site areas where harmful plants or animals are present, employees who may be
exposed shall be instructed regarding the potential hazards, and how to avoid injury, and
the first aid procedures to be used in the event o f injury.

1926.21(b)(5)
Employees required to handle or use flammable liquids, gases, or toxic materials shall
be instructed in the safe handling and use o f these materials and made aware o f the
specific requirements contained in Subparts D, F, and other applicable subparts o f this
part.

1926.21(b)(6)

1926.2 l(b)(6)(i)
29

All employees required to enter into confined or enclosed spaces shall be instructed
as to the nature o f the hazards involved, the necessary precautions to be taken, and in the
use of protective and emergency equipment required. The employer shall comply with
any specific regulations that apply to work in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas.

1926.2 l(b)(6)(ii)
For purposes o f paragraph (b)(6)(i) o f this section, "confined or enclosed space"
means any space having a limited means o f egress, which is subject to the accumulation
of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen deficient atmosphere. Confined or
enclosed spaces include, but are not limited to, storage tanks, process vessels, bins,
boilers, ventilation or exhaust ducts, sewers, underground utility vaults, turmels,
pipelines, and open top spaces more than 4 feet in depth such as pits, tubs, vaults, and
vessels.

OSHA has set the guidelines for safety on construction sites, as well as in other
industries. However, it is the duty o f employers to provide and ensure the training o f the
workers. Employers must establish criteria, goals, and a plan o f implementation on how
the training o f its workforce will be executed. Each safety training program shall be
unique to the needs o f that specific organization or operation to guarantee success. First,
employers must establish who is in need o f training. The answer is everyone needs
formal training. All individuals that are involved in the organization must be educated on
general jobsite training from those at top level management positions down to the
individuals at the operational level. General safety training shall provide an in-depth
understanding o f all potential hazards that may occur while working on construction
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projects. Also, the training must provide individuals the competency on recognizing
potential hazards and unsafe work practices. Training must also involve training that is
specific to that particular project. Organizations must perform a job hazard analysis to
pinpoint those existing or potential hazards that may occur. For example, if a crane is
required during construction the organization is responsible for making sure all
individuals are competent on crane safety and best practices.
No safety training program is effective without an established implementation effort
by the organization. Fiori (2004) recognizes several methods that should be utilized to
help in the implementation phase including: checklists, policy enforcement, and routine
safety meetings. Checklists are a simple, inexpensive method o f implementing safety on
a project. The checklists allow workers, as well as managers, to routinely review rules,
regulations, and procedures that are specific to the operations to be performed. Policy
enforcement is a major component of safety training program that re-emphasizes the
importance o f management commitment to safety. No training program will be effective
without the committed enforcement o f those who regulate it. After training, employers
must require workers to sign a contract acknowledging that they have received training
and fully understand the expectations o f the organization in regards to safety. At this
point, policy enforcement is required by the organization to guarantee that individuals are
performing safe practice during their routine operations. Finally, routine safety meetings
must be conducted to “further enforce and bolster the safety commitment and culture on a
job site” (Fiori, 2004). Meetings should be scheduled at the start o f the work week. This
reiterates the notion that safety is the first priority o f the organization; this suggests that
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safety should be considered before any other job task or activity.

3.4 Employee/Worker Involvement
As previously mentioned, the success o f a construction safety culture relies on the
commitment of management to establish and maintain safety within a system. However,
the achievement o f a construction safety culture requires the active participation o f all
individuals within an organization, especially those at the operational level. In system
dynamics modeling, worker involvement can be measured as the level o f commitment or
participation o f workers to the safety culture of their organization. This can be
determined by survey, interview, or questiormaires. Workers may be asked to rate, using
a 1-5 Likert scale, their commitment and the perceived commitment o f their peers to the
construction safety culture o f the organization.
Safety is the responsibility o f every person. One must not assume that someone else
has taken their safety into consideration when they walk onto a construction project, so
workers must become actively involved for their own benefit, as well as their colleagues.
“Management must be willing to devolve some decision-making power to the workforce
by allowing them to become actively involved in developing safety interventions and
safety policy, rather than simply playing the more passive role o f recipient” (Williamson
et al., 1997). Providing the opportunities for worker involvement in decision making
regarding safety also develops a trust relationship between management and operatives
which will result in compliance with safety rules. Gamer (2004) suggests that employees
who become actively involved in the safety program o f their organization become
stakeholders— they develop a sense o f ownership for the success o f the venture and
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support it. OSHA (2006) provides examples o f active and meaningful participation that
workers must perform to help establish the construction safety culture in their
organization including:
•

Participating in ad-hoc safety problem-solving programs

•

Participating in accident and incident investigations

•

Developing or participating in employee-involved suggestion programs

•

Training other employees in safety

•

Analyzing the job and/or processing hazards

•

Acting as safety observers

•

Serving on safety committees

Management commitment is at the helm o f construction safety culture; however, if
operatives do not “buy into” the safety program of the organization there will be
devastating consequences. Failure o f workers to actively participate in the program will
lead to increased injuries and/or fatalities on any construction project.

3.5 Safety-Focused Planning and Design
It may be difficult to accept but, in regards to safety, some construction projects may
be doomed from the very beginning. Why? Many owners, architects, designers,
engineers, schedulers and all others involved in the planning and preconstruction phases
o f construction seldom take safety into account. Often the only concern with these
individuals is cost, feasibility, and profit. Through technological advances including
computer software such as AutoCad 3D and Revit, the designs of buildings and other
structures continue to increase in complexity. Architects and engineers are designing
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buildings that are taller, and o f varying geometrical shapes. Should we assume that when
designing structure such as Las Vegas’ City Center or Dubai’s Burj Dubai that the design
staff accounts for the safety o f the individuals that will ultimately construct it? It is
highly likely that safety was either considered very, very little or not at all. This is
extremely troubling. To achieve a safety culture within a construction organization
safety must be incorporated from the commencement o f pre-project planning. As
mentioned previously, a system that possesses a safety culture is one in which safety is
the first priority o f all individuals involved from top-level management to those at the
operational level including, but not limited to owners, architects, engineers, general
contractors, subcontractors, vendors, workers, etc. Whittington et al. (1992) illustrated
how failures in project planning can eventually lead to accidents on construction sites in
their model o f construction industry accident causation. Effective planning and design
for safety is essential if projects are to be delivered on time, without cost overrun, and
most importantly without accidents (Cameron and Duff, 1999).
How do we incorporate safety into the design and planning phases o f construction?
Many designers and planners lack knowledge and experience to predict how their designs
affect those individuals and the duties they perform on the project site. The International
Labour Office (ILO) (1992) specifically states that designers should: receive training in
health and safety; integrate the health and safety o f construction workers into the design
and plarming process; not include anything in the design which would necessitate the use
of dangerous structural or other procedures or hazardous materials which could be
avoided by the design modifications or by the substitute materials, and take into account
the health and safety of workers during subsequent maintenance. Admittedly, this
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approach may seem rather far-fetched, but it is possible and will, in fact, result in
decreases in accidents and fatalities on the job site. Safety-oriented design and plarming
only requires a change or shift in focus from the design persormel. Architects and
engineers must adopt new approaches in the design phase, which prioritizes safety before
constructability, feasibility, production, etc.
The importance o f effective plarming and design which incorporates safety as its’ first
priority carmot be overemphasized. “The more significant the project design and
management teams involvement is in the safety plarming effort, the greater the likelihood
of positive outcomes for the project’s risk-control program” (Broderick, 2004). It is also
important for design and plarming team to incorporate safety which is unique and ideal to
that particular project in which they are working because every project design is different
in some form. Incorporating safety into the design phase will eliminate those potentially
risky hazards that workers may encounter before the onset o f construction. In the
construction industry it is a known fact that the earlier problems, hazards, etc. are
recognized and addressed in the construction process (entire) the more options the
organizations have when exploring solutions. These options also tend to be much
cheaper than they would during the construction phase. Therefore, design persormel
including architects, engineers and managers should perform constructability reviews
during the design phase to identify potential safety threats early on. The Construction
Industry Institute (CII) based in Austin, Texas defines constructability as the optimum
use o f construction knowledge and experience in plarming, engineering, procurement,
and field operations to achieve ultimate objectives (Jergeas and Van der Put, 2001).
Constructability reviews will result in improved safety during the construction phase.
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Toole (2005) supports the increase o f designers’ role in construction safety. In his study,
Toole recognizes five tasks that civil design engineers may perform differently than the
traditional duties of design professionals to contribute to construction safety. These tasks
include: reviewing their designs, creating design documents, assisting the owner in
procuring construction, reviewing submittals, and inspecting work in progress. Toole
(2005) also list those barriers that prevent design engineers from adopting an increased
involvement in safety including: lack o f safety expertise, lack o f understanding o f the
construction process, typical contract terms, and professional fees. It will be beneficial to
the construction industry, as a whole, to educate design professionals on safety and
construction processes just as construction managers may receive education and training
on business management.
Gamabatese et. al (1997) addressed the much required need for incorporating safety
into the design phase. Their research cited the lack o f designers’ involvement in worker
safety as being attributed to minimal education and experience in addressing safety on the
construction site, and their attempt to minimize their liability exposure. In 1993 and
1994, surveys were conducted on owners o f projects who responded on the role o f
designers’ consideration to safety in the design o f the owners’ projects. Their responses
supported data that unfortunately design professionals give much less consideration to
safety than necessary to make a positive impact on construction safety. And, since
OSHA places the responsibility o f safety on employers and not on design professionals
they are even less motivated to prioritize safety. Figure 11 presents the breakdown o f the
results o f the survey. In fact, 45% o f the interviewed owners admitted that worker safety
was not taken into account during the design o f their projects. Another 29% stated that
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safety was occasionally addressed in their designs depending on specific activities.

May address
safety in future, -,
10%

Worker safety
not considered,
45%

Worker safety is
addressed, 16%

Occasionally
address safety
for specific
items, 29%

Figure 11. Owners response regarding worker safety in design (Gambatese et ah, 1997)

To provide a reactive solution to this severe problem, Gambatese et. al (1997)
developed software called the “Design for Construction Safety Toolbox” that aids
designers in recognizing potential threats and hazards. Interviews were conducted from
various professionals in the construction industry— owners, designers, project managers,
workers, etc. They were asked to provide suggestions for designers to take into
consideration when designing projects. These suggestions, in addition to information
collected from best practice manuals and literature, were compiled into a computer
database that the design professionals can reference during their work. Since the start of
this research in 1994, Gamabatese and his colleagues have input over 400 suggestions
into the safety design tool database. The tables 1 through 5 present the number o f
suggestions that were provided (via interview) categorized by design discipline, and the
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percentage o f those suggestions that were incorporated into the “Design for Construction
Safety Toolbox.”

Table 1

Design Suggestion Sources (Gambatese et al., 1997)

Number

Source

Number o f
Suggestions

% of
Recorded
Suggestions

1

Safety Design Manuals and Checklists

140

32.6

2

Authors and Safety Taskforce Members

123

28.6

3

Interview (Telephone, in Person)

81

18.8

Constructors and Designers

{50}

Academics

{17}

Local/state/federal public agency
persormel

{7}

Owners

{5}

Designers

{2}

4

OSHA (CFR, publications, data)

34

7.9

5

Journal articles

19

4.4

6

Periodicals

14

3.3

7

Public safety courses

8

1.9

8

Other ( NIOSH, HBR Constructability
Plan)

11

2.6

430

100

Total

38

Table 2

Number o f Suggestions Recorded by Discipline (Gambatese et al., 1997)

Number

Number o f Times
Addressed

Design D isciplines

% of
Recorded
Suggestions

1

Structural

141

32.8

2

Architectural

127

29.5

3

Piping/plumbing

84

19.5

4

Electrical/instrumentation

69

16

5

Mechanical/HV AC

69

16

6

Construction management

62

14.4

7

Civil

48

11.2

8

Tanks/vessels

17

4

9

Traffic/transportation

16

3.7

10

Geotechnical

5

1.2

11

Coating/insulation

3

0.7

Total

641

*Since suggestions may address more than one design diseipline, the sum o f these numbers (expressed as
% o f 430 reeorded suggestions) exeeeds 100
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Table 3

Project Components Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambates et al.,
1997)
Number o f Times
Addressed

Project Component

Number

%of
Recorded
Suggestions

1

Piping

77

17.9

2

Electrical/Instrumentation

58

13.5

3

M echanical/HV AC

55

12.8

4

Structural framing

52

12.1

5

Stairs, ladder, ramp

43

10

6

Work schedule/sequence

41

9.5

7

Slab on grade, floor, roof

35

8.1

8

32

7.4

9

Roads, paving, flatwork
General conditions/special
provisions

31

7.2

10

Earthwork, sewer, etc.

24

5.6

11

Furnishings, finishes

20

4.7

12

Structural plan/elevation

20

4.7

13
14

Door, window
Foundation

19
18

4.4
4.2

15

Project layout

16

3.7

16

Tank, vessel

16

3.7

17

Technical specifications

13

3

18

Walkway, platform

11

2.6

19

Contract drawings

10

2.3

20

Handrail, guardrail

10

2.3

Total

601

40

Table 4 Construction Site Hazards Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambatese
et a l, 1997)
Number

Construction Site Hazard

Number o f Times
Addressed

%of
Recorded
Suggestions

1

Falls

141

32.8

2

Electric shock

60

14

3

Explosions

57

13.3

4

Cave-in

56

13

5

Fire

42

9.8

6

Toxic Substances

38

8.8

7

Work area

34

7.9

8

Environmental/climate

31

7.2

9

Struck by objects

25

5.8

10

Vehicular traffic

25

5.8

11

Work issues

21

4.9

12

On-line equipment

20

4.7

13

Obstructions

18

4.2

14

Heavy equipment

13

3

15

Confined space

10

2.3

16

Caught in between

6

1.4

17

Lighting

5

1.2

Total

602

*Since suggestions may address more than one construction site hazard, the sum o f these
num bers (expressed as % o f the 430 recorded suggestions) exceeds 100.
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Table 5

Project Systems Addressed by Design Suggestions (Gambatese et
al., 1997)

Division

Project System

Number o f Times
Addressed

% of
Recorded
Suggestions

15

Mechanical

118

27.4

2

Sitework

69

16

10

Specialties

68

15.8

16

Electrical

58

13.5

1

General Conditions

51

11.9

5

Metal

30

7

3

Concrete

26

6

8

Doors and windows

19

4.4

11

Equipment

19

4.4

13

Special construction

16

3.7
2.8

6

W ood and plastics

12

9

Finishes

8

1.9

7

Thermal and moisture protection

6

1.4

4

Masonry

4

0.9

14

Conveying systems

3

0.7

12

Furnishings

2

0.5

Total

509

*Since suggestions may address more than one project system, the sum o f these
numbers (expressed as % o f the 430 recorded suggestions) exceeds 100.

If used effectively by design professionals, the tool by Gambatese et. al (1997) can
have a tremendous positive impact on the safety culture o f the organizations which utilize
it. In system dynamics modeling the factor, safety-oriented designs can be measured by
the number o f hours spent by architects, designers, and engineers reviewing their designs
and incorporating the use o f CII/Gambatese model “Design for Construction Safety
Toolbox.” Now that the lack o f training and education has been addressed with this tool,
we must now aim to alter the mentalities o f designers in which they, themselves, take
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more responsibility and liability o f their designs on the individuals that have to construct
them.
Scheduling is another aspect o f construction that occurs in the planning phases in
which safety should be incorporated to target and account for those activities that may
pose potential threats to workers when construction has begun. In system dynamics
modeling the factor safety-oriented planning and scheduling can be measured as amount
o f additional hours allocated to those construction activities that pose increased threats o f
accidents during the construction process. In addition to designers and engineers,
schedulers should also receive training on safety and construction processes to leam
which activities have increased hazards or risks. Yi and Langford (2006) presented a
theory o f safety planning method which estimates the risk distribution o f a project and
helps the safety manager to both estimate situations o f concentrated risk and then
reschedule activities when necessary. This method requires coordination between the
scheduler and the safety manager to eliminate the occurrence o f activities before the
construction phase. Experience and knowledge o f past projects is also a prerequisite for
safety-focused scheduling. If various activities caused hazardous situations on past
projects, then these activities should be identified, evaluated, and incorporated into the
scheduling o f future projects.
There has been significant research that has identified the benefits o f incorporating
safety into the planning, design, and scheduling phases o f construction. Kartam (1997)
discussed the introduction of safety measures into construction plans using critical path
method (CPM) techniques. Tam et al. (2001) devised a method of allocating resources
according to their order o f priority after comparing safety improvement measures
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developed in the construction industry, Saurin et al. (2004) developed a safety planning
and control model which integrated safety management with production planning and
control. Incorporating scheduling and safety is a requirement for achieving a
construction safety culture.
Many accidents in the construction industry are attributed to human error. Production
pressures often lead individuals to “cut comers” or engage in hazardous behaviors
(failure to tie-off, working without PPE, operating without clearance, etc.) to make up for
time. In due time, these hazardous behaviors eventually result in injuries and/or fatalities.
If workers, as well as organizations, compare the time lost while taking necessary safety
precautions to the time lost during the occurrence o f an accident the workers may think
twice before “cutting corners” and the organizations will be more strict on allowing these
hazardous behaviors. If hazards can be identified early on and the adequate time and
resources are allocated to the activities in the scheduling phase then delays caused by
accidents will be, more than likely, eliminated.
The importance o f safety focused scheduling must not be underestimated. Accidents
resulting in injury and fatalities can have uncontrollable and often irreversible impacts on
a project’s schedule. When accidents occur, especially those serious in nature, projects
tend to come to halt. Accidents result in lost time and productivity. The situation will
affect the morale o f the organization which will cause workers to either slow down or
stop work altogether. That particular area o f the job site may be temporarily closed down
for investigation. All in all, the project’s efficient production is severely affected and
typically results in the project being behind schedule. Once a schedule is behind it is
often difficult to get back on track. Therefore, taking the necessary steps to incorporate
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safety into the scheduling process is beneficial for the entire system.

3.6 Accident Reporting and Investigation System
Accident reporting and investigation systems are an integral part o f any safety
management program, and this system must exist to establish a safety culture within an
organization. In system dynamics modeling, accident reporting and investigation system
can be measured by the number o f times the accident reporting and investigation system
was used during a construction project or a specified time period. It is the responsibility
of management to establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement
systems. Without a reporting system, there is no way to measure and assess the state of
the systems safety.
The objective o f the reporting system is to not only monitor accident rates, but to
identify accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect o f site safety initiatives,
and to estimate the costs o f accidents (Rowlinson, 2004). A safety reporting system is
another activity that requires continuous, active participation o f all members within an
organization from top level management to the operational level. Many times
construction accidents go unreported for various reasons. Workers may not report
accidents because they may feel that their position may be jeopardized; they may feel that
the lack o f severity did not require the reporting o f an accident; they sometimes feel that
the company will require them to take time off, etc. Construction companies may fail to
report an accident for fear o f insurance increases. Whatever the case, no excuse is valid
for failure to report any accident that occurs on the project site. Cooke and Rohleder
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(2006) states that the fraction o f incidents reported is dependent on the personal
commitment to safety of the workers who observe or are involved in the incidents.
Reporting systems reveal valuable information on the status o f an organizations
safety culture, and allows progress within the organization to be tracked over time.
Rowlinson (2004) states that the role o f the reporting system in an organization is to
reduce the occurrence o f accidents by analyzing and reporting on accident causation and
highlighting areas where action is needed. Highlighting these areas where action is
needed requires thorough investigations on the part o f management. Again, the notion of
management’s commitment to safety comes into play. If management is committed to
the construction safety culture o f their organization they will be willing to perform
thorough investigations to identify errors in their safety program for future prevention.
The goal o f investigations is to collect as much information about the accidents as
possible. These investigations must not only investigate those unsafe acts or behaviors
that caused the accident, but most importantly, those root causes that provided the
opportunity for those unsafe acts to exist. The information may collected by performing
a site examination, performing interviews with witnesses, etc. Organizations must leam
from the information collected from reporting and investigation system to maintain and
enhance the safety culture within their environments.

3.7 Safety Investment
When thinking o f safety investment, what comes to mind is the slogan, “if you do not
put anything into the bank, then you will not get anything out.” In system dynamics
modeling, safety investment can be measured as the amount o f dollars a construction
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organization spends annually on safety resources including: safety personnel (safety
managers, officers, etc), safety equipment, and safety training and promotions. There is
no secret to success when it pertains to safety. The fact is that those organizations which
possess a construction safety culture and have stellar records when it comes to safety
have invested a substantial amount o f resources (both time and money) into their safety
programs. Tang et al. (1997) identifies the three components o f safety investment as:
(a) Safety administration personnel
Site staff and head office staff; safety officers and safety supervisors on site to
monitor safety-related matters.
Some large contractors will employ safety manager/senior safety officers to
direct and coordinate safety staff.
The salary o f these personnel and their supporting staff are part o f the
investment.
(b) Safety equipment
Purchasing of safety boots, goggles, safety fences, first-aid facilities, etc.
which are related to safety on the site.
(c) Safety training and promotion
Safety training courses are organized by contractors for their employees
Safety promotion includes the printing o f pamphlets and posters, the
production o f safety advertising banners and boards, organization o f safety
campaign and monetary rewarding o f individual workers who achieve a god
safety standard o f work, etc.
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An organization’s safety investment should be directly proportional to its safety
performance, and vice versa. The underlying theme o f construction safety culture is
management’s commitment. The routine presence of safety personnel on a construction
site emphasizes that level of commitment that an organization places on safety. It is
unfortunate that companies must invest hundreds o f thousands or possibly millions of
dollars to achieve safety culture within their organizations; however, it is reality. As
unfortunate as it may appear, many operatives do not prioritize their own safety when
working in the field. They tend to overestimate their skills and abilities in performing
their trade, and they underestimate potential hazards and dangers that they face when they
enter construction sites. It is also unfortunate that the occupations o f safety officers,
safety managers, etc. exist predominantly to pose as constant reminders to workers that
their safety is first priority. In the absence o f safety personnel, many individuals only
prioritize production. Therefore, organizations must invest in people to monitor and
ensure that workers are complying with safety regulations.
A substantial amount o f an organization’s investment on their safety program must be
allocated to proper, updated safety equipment for workers. This not only includes
personal protective equipment (PPE)— safety goggles, hard hats, gloves, etc., but also
state-of-the art machinery and tools designed and guaranteed to decrease the risk o f
worker injuries and fatalities on construction sites. One way o f addressing safety issues
on site is to provide irmovative technological solutions to problems. Outdated and poorquality equipment has been the direct cause o f many construction accidents, historically.
Construction organizations must be willing to take advantage o f the modern,
technological advancements in construction equipment.
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The major reasons companies lack much o f the proper tools and equipment is cost.
Management’s commitment to safety culture is once again revisited. As mentioned time
after time, most organizations prioritize profit and productivity over safety. The goal of
companies is to get the greatest possible return on investment. The profit margin in the
construction industry is typically very low with most organizations making an average of
1% to 3% profit on any given project. So, some companies take unnecessary risks by
providing their employees with the “bare minimum,” sub-standard and outdated
equipment that will get the job done.
Modem construction equipment, in fact, is very expensive; however, investing in
innovative equipment or even renting it is a win-win situation for construction
companies. Not only will companies get increased safety performance but increased
productivity performance as well. And, when comparing the cost o f equipment purchase
or rental to the phenomenal cost that injuries and fatalities have on organizations resource
investment on safety is, without a doubt, the most logical decision to make. The fact is
that the majority o f construction companies are not those large “powerhouse”
corporations that are featured in the Engineering News Record Magazine (ENR). Most
constmction organizations are relatively small and their net worth is typically not that
high. The point is—the average company, although insured, cannot withstand the impact
of a serious accident on a constmction project. An unfortunate fatality, with a valued
cost o f $4 million according to the CPWR (2007), will likely force the average
construction company out o f business. Therefore, resource investment in safety culture is
critical for survival in the constmction industry. Technological advancements in
construction equipment addresses the number one concern o f most organizations
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worldwide— how to get more production without jeopardizing the safety o f the
workforce. Resource investment is the key.
By now, it is evident that safety culture at the surface level is very basic and simple to
achieve. As mentioned before, it is unfortunate that much of the effort exerted on
achieving construction safety culture revolves around “babysitting,” for a lack o f better
words. This opinion may be rather extreme; however, it is reality. Construction safety
culture entails posing a constant reminder to all individuals within a system that safety is
the first priority. One form o f reiterating safety to workers on a construction site is
through safety training and promotions. Training has been addressed earlier in this
thesis. Promoting safety through banners, posters, pamphlets, etc. is an inexpensive
method o f advertising an organization’s stance on the safety culture. It also gives the
workers a constant reminder o f the rules and regulations that they have agreed upon
before beginning work on the project. Organizations must take any and every measure
possible to promote the safety culture within their organizations. The impact of
promotions material will have many positive impacts on the construction safety culture of
an organization.

3.8 Contractor/ Sub-Contractor Selection
To achieve construction safety culture within a system every company and individual
must be on board with safety as their main objective while completing the project.
Therefore, owners and general contractors must be stricter in selecting contractors and
sub-contractors to perform work on their projects. Besides, owners and general
contractors do have an economic stake in the safety performance o f subcontractors due to
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required insurance coverage for workers during the construction process, i.e. ownercontrolled insurance programs or contractor controlled insurance programs. Recall that
culture is defined as shared values, goals, and beliefs within a group or system. The key
word is shared. It is highly unlikely if not impossible to achieve a construction safety
culture within a system if the sub-contractors do not share the values or beliefs in safety
as the owner o f the project or the general contractor. All parties involved must have the
same vision or philosophy in regards to safety. To ensure that specialty contractors and
sub-contractors share the same vision o f construction safety culture, both owners (clients)
and general contractors must implement a selective prequalification or screening process.
This is accomplished by reviewing the contractor’s past safety history or experience
modification rate. Emmons (2006) states that the following information should be
reviewed from the past three years o f the company: OSHA recordable rates (now referred
to as incident rate), lost work day rate, and obtain references from most recent clients.
The experience modification rate (EMR) is a system designed to determine a
company’s premiums for worker’ compensation insurance. The rating takes into account
the compensation losses for an organization’s type o f work and amount o f payroll, and
predicts the cost of expected losses to be paid by that employer within a three-year rating
period. The EMR is calculated according to the following formula

---------\
EMR = ---------------- 77— —--- T—^ —r— Y— -— 7— r
PL, + B V + {{e l - P L ,)x W V )+ { l- W V )x {EL - P L ,)

where B V is the ballast value, EL expected losses, IL actual incurred losses, PL a is the
actual primary losses, PL e is the expected primary losses, and WV is the weighting value.
The rating is then compared to other companies who perform the same type o f work to
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develop an experience rating.

Lower rates are equivalent to fewer accidents occurring

in the three year rating period.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (1970) requires employers to record and
report accident information on an Occupational Injuries and Illnesses Annual Survey
Form known as the OSHA 300 log which must be retained for a minimum o f five years
(Beaujon and Everett, 2004). The information on the contractor’s log includes: number
o f fatalities, number o f injuries and illnesses involving lost work days, number o f injuries
and illnesses involving restricted work days, number o f days away from work, number of
day o f restricted work activity, number o f injuries and illnesses without lost work days.
To obtain the OSHA-recordable incident rate calculate the total number o f fatalities,
injuries, illnesses involving lost and restricted work days, and injuries and illnesses
without lost work days. Incidents are simply defined as individual occurrences or events.
This number (No. of incidents) is then multiplied by 200,000 hours, and then divided by
the total number of employee hours worked during that year:
, .,
„
Number o f incidents x 200,000 hours
Incident Rate = -------------------------------------------------Number o f hours worked
The 200,000 hours represents the standard base for incident rates which is equal to 100
employees working 40 hours per week for 50 weeks out o f the year. Reviewing a
company’s OSHA recordable incident rates provide owners and general contractors with
a very accurate representation o f how safely workers from that sub-contractor will
perform, as w ell as com ply with safety regulations on future projects. It also serves as a

model for management’s level o f commitment to safety within that organization. If an
organization has high incidence rate, it is safe to assume that a construction safety culture
is non-existent and the prioritization o f safety is very minimum.
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Owners and general contractors must establish higher standards for the companies
that they choose to perform work for them.

The reason that the construction industry

has such high injury and fatality rates is because o f mixed priorities. The only factor that
management generally takes into consideration is cost. Companies want the most for
less— the majority o f contracts in this business are awarded to the lowest bidder. It is
standard industry practice to select the lowest, competent bidder; however, the
competency o f the specialty or subcontractor is usually overlooked or not emphasized
because o f prioritization on the low bid that they may have submitted. A popular phrase
that pertains to this discussion o f contractor selection is “you get what you pay for!”
Owners and general contractors responsible for selecting specialty or subcontractors
have two alternatives: they can either pay more in the earlier phases o f the construction
process by selecting a bidder who shares the same value and commitment to safety as
they do, or pay more later in workers’ compensation, lawsuits, etc. as a result o f selecting
the lowest bidder who places no importance on the construction safety culture of their
organization. “As a contractor’s safety focus and execution decreases, the owner’s costs
increase. If an owner chooses to work with select, safer contractors, then the owners’
costs will be significantly less. Owners who pay attention to contractor safety records
experience fewer third-party lawsuits and get more efficient execution o f their work”
(Beaujon and Smith, 2004). All decisions made early on during the pre-construction
phases o f a project will significantly impact cost once construction has begun.
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CHAPTER 4

MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Systems Thinking
Systems thinking can be viewed in many fashions— as a concept or idea, as an
approach or study, or as a tool to create a better understanding. Whichever way it is
viewed, the objective o f system thinking is very “cut and dry”—to provide a clear
understanding to complex, real world problems and situations by examining systems
holistically. Everything around us makes up some kind o f system which means that all
things in an environment have some kind o f connection between them. As human beings,
it is in our nature to solve problems by dissecting them into smaller pieces and analyzing
various aspects individually. This approach may work for very simple problems, but
when we destroy the connection between system components by breaking them down
into smaller parts we run the risk o f losing valuable, or possibly latent, information about
that system that may have provided a better understanding or solution. Systems thinking,
as defined by Sherwood (2002), is the study o f the connectedness between those systems’
component parts whether they be human beings, departments, or indeed businesses and
organizations, as a whole. To gain the understanding o f complex systems it is imperative
that we maintain the connectedness o f system components, and study the system in its
entirety. There are two tools used in systems thinking that provides a better
understanding; (1) causal loop diagrams, which describe complex systems in terms of
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cause-and effect relationships, and (2) system dynamics modeling which allows the
behavior o f system components to be evaluated over time in computer simulations.
Sherwood (2002) presents the many benefits o f using system thinking as a tool for
understanding including:
•

Systems thinking can help you tame the complexity o f real-world problems by
providing a structured way o f balancing a broad, complete view with the selection
o f the right o f detail.

•

Causal loop diagrams—a visual method o f capturing this now-tamed complexity—
are a powerful means o f communication, and their use can ensure that as wide a
community as you wish has a genuinely, and deeply, shared view. This is
enormously valuable in building high-performing teams.

•

Causal loop diagrams can also help you identify the wisest way o f influencing the
system o f interest. As a result, you can avoid taking poor decisions, for example
decisions that look like fixes but are likely to backfire.

•

System dynamics modeling is a computer modeling technique that allows you to
simulate how a complex system, as expressed as a causal loop diagram, is likely
to evolve over time. This provides you with a “laboratory o f the future,” so that
you can test likely consequences o f actions, decisions, or policies before you are
obliged to commit.

•

Overall, systems thinking can help you take decisions that pass the most stringent
test there is— the test o f time.

As mentioned throughout this thesis, many critics believe that safety culture is just a
“catch-all” fad that cannot realistically be achieved on projects in the construction
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industry. Much o f the skepticism on this topic may be contributed to pass researchers’
failure to precisely define those steps that organizations must take to establish safety
culture on a construction project or any other system. Past research has attempted to
explain safety (or lack of) by dissecting and examining the various factors or variables.
This is our instinctual behavior as humans. It is assumed that when things are broken
down into component parts it is easier to gather the information or insight that we are
seeking about what it is that we are studying. “Taking a complex, dynamic, and circular
world and linearizing it into a set o f snapshots may make things seem simpler, but we
may totally misread the very reality we were seeking to understand” (Kim, 1994).
Systems thinking suggest that all the answers we are in search o f are best revealed by
studying systems in their entirety. Creating a system thinking model will provide an
objective analysis o f the connectedness or cause-and-effect relationships between all
factors required to achieve a construction safety culture.

4.2 Cause-and-Effect Relationships
In system thinking, cause-and-effect relationships are presented in the form o f a
diagram known as the causal loop diagram. The diagram consists o f all factors or
variables that make up the system in which we are studying. The relationships between
variables are represented by arrows and may be given the designation o f positive (+) or
negative (-) depending on the type o f relationship. Positive relationships are those in
which the factors are going the in same direction. Figure 12 represents a positive causal
relationship between corporate-level and project-level management’s commitment.
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corporate-level
m anagem ent
comm itm ent

project-level
m anagem ent
comm itm ent

Figure 12. Positive causal relationship between corporate level and project level
management’s commitment

Negative relationships are going in the opposite direction. For example, as
management’s commitment to safety increases, injuries decrease. The arrow representing
the relationship between management commitment and accidents will be denoted with a
sign. Figure 13 represents a negative causal relationship between management
commitment to safety and number o f injuries.

management
commitment to safety

mjunes
Figure 13. Negative causal relationship between management commitment and
number of injuries.

All causal loop diagrams have one central feature in common which is known as the
feedback loop. Feedback loops imply that all factors or variables in the diagram are
connected in some way. “Feedback manifests itself in causal loop diagrams by the
presence o f one or more continuous, closed loops: loops representing chains of causality
that link back on themselves, loops with no beginning and no end, and loops in which
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everything is ultimately connected to everything else” (Sherwood, 2002). Henceforth,
construction safety culture is a feedback loop. Feedback loops can be divided into two
distinct chains o f causality known as reinforcing and balancing loops. A feedback loop is
known as reinforcing if the number of negatives (-) in that complete loop are even, and
classified as balancing loops if the number o f negatives (-) in the loop is an odd number.
In reinforcing loops, feedback increases the impact of change and in balancing loops the
causal relationship between variables keeps the system in equilibrium.
For this exploratory study Vensim, a modeling program, is used to create a
qualitative mental model o f how safety culture can be achieved in a construction system.
“Vensim, the Ventana Simulation environment, is an integrated framework for
conceptualizing, building, simulating, analyzing, optimizing, and deploying models o f
dynamic systems” (www.ventanasvstemsinc.comI. Using modeling software to
understand safety related topics is not a new approach. Howell and Obren (2005) used
Powersim to investigate the validity o f their approach to develop an understanding o f the
interaction o f safety policies with the school bus environment in New Zealand. Milrad
(2002) suggests using STELLA, Powersim, StarLogo, and Agentsheets as ideal modeling
tools and programs which enable users to develop better intuitions about the mechanisms
that govern dynamic interactions. In their study o f the space shuttles Columbia and
Challenger accidents, Dulac et al. (2005) performed a 200-run Monte Carlo sensitivity
simulation to investigate the effects o f their model, the Independent Technical Authority
structure, on NASA. DYNAMO was the modeling tool o f choice in Nuthmann’s (1994)
research o f the use o f human judgment in system dynamics models o f social systems.
DYNAMO was the first system dynamics modeling software and was developed by Jay
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Forester at the, then newly founded, Sloan School of Management at the Massachutsett
Institute of Technology. Details of DYNAMO may be found in Richardson and Pugh
(1981). DYNAMO is no longer used due to the advent o f advanced, micro-computer
based programs such as STELLA, Vensim, Powersim, Berkely Madonna, Mystrategy,
AnyLogic, etc. For the purposes o f this exploratory study, Vensim was chosen various
reasons: (1) it is easy to use for first-time and experienced modelers, (2) it provides a
practical way o f communicating how complex systems function, (3) allows the
simulation of systems over time, bridges the gap between theory and real world,
demonstrates changes and predicts outcomes within a system, (4) the program has builtin functions which automatically produce mathematical, statistical, and logical data, and
(5) provides sensitivity analysis which reveal which sectors o f the construction safety
system may potentially be in jeopardy, and (6) it was cost efficient— Vensim allows a free
downloadable version to be used for educational purpose in comparisons to other
programs that cost anywhere from two hundred to thousands o f dollars.
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Figure 14. Systems thinking model o f construction safety culture.

Figure 14 represents the systems thinking model o f construction safety culture
developed by this research. This model provides a visual or mental representation o f
those factors requisite to achieving a construction safety culture in addition to other
factors that are either directly or indirectly related to the safety in complex systems. The
model was constructed in group model building sessions that involved Dr. David Shields,
Prof. Neil Opfer, and myself. In our group model building sessions, “group think” style
brainstorming was used to come to a consensus on which factors were most relevant to
achieving a construction safety culture and the causal relationships or interconnectedness
that exist among them. It is important to remember that systems thinking models are
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closed systems that have no definite starting point and no ending point. There are many
factors within this model that share more than one relationship. This is typical o f system
dynamics modeling— to gain the insight or answers to the hidden problems, we must
study and exhaust all possibilities for relatedness between variables. It is the objective of
this thesis that this model will add clarity to the concept o f construction safety culture and
express how it can be achieved.
As mentioned earlier, construction safety culture is a top-down approach to achieving
safety in construction organizations. By top-down approach it is not meant that a
commitment must come from only those individuals that are directly involved in the dayto-day construction activities, but also those individuals such as the owner/client possess
the ultimate power to make impacts on a construction project. Having this ultimate
power means that the owner possesses the initial capability o f making safety first priority
and establishing it as a culture on his/her project to be constructed. Although
management commitment is the foundation o f construction safety culture, the top-down
approach suggests that the initial commitment should come from the owner or client.
Historically, this has been the first obstacle to achieving safety on construction projects.
Why? The answer is cost.
Cost has always been the driving force in the construction industry. Owners/clients
want the most for their money. They want the most elaborate buildings that can be built
and they want them for the lowest price that they can obtain. So, often they award
contracts to the bidder with the lowest prices and seldom take any other criteria or
qualifications into account i.e. EMR, OSHA-recordable incidents, etc. This lowest cost
mentality is particularly prevalent in public works projects. Awarding contracts to the
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lowest bidder frequently does not result in being the less expensive route for owners or
contractors. However, this method is persistent even though its’ weaknesses and
disadvantages are well known and recognized. Through owner-controlled insurance
programs, accidents on jobsites, and workmen’s compensation claims, owners in some
way or another, always have a financial stake in the safety o f their projects. It is to their
best interest to pre-qualify potential bidders and have a set o f established criteria,
especially safety-related criteria, that organizations must meet to perform work for that
owner/client.
The first causal relationships that exist in this system thinking model is the between
“owner/client commitment to safety, contractor/suh-contractor selection criteria, and
corporate level management commitment to safety.” The system thinking model states
that there is a positive causal relationship between the owner/client commitment to safety
and the contractor/sub-contractor selection criteria. The model states that as
owners/clients commitment to safety increases the number o f pre-qualifying criteria
involved in selecting the appropriate contractor increases. Owners have the ability to
positively or negatively influence the safety o f their projects during the selection o f their
contractors. Bids are generally awarded to the lowest, competent bidder. However, as
safety data and research suggests that many contractors lack competency in recognizing
the importance o f safety in the construction process. Owners/clients neglect safety for
the same reasons that contractors performing the work do— it is because they view safety
as an overhead expense rather than an investment and eventually a cost saving benefit.
To owners, as well as the organizations that construct their projects, safety is believed to
be an expense that does not directly yield profits— hence, overhead. Many are ignorant
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o f the direct positive impacts that safety has on productivity. Productivity is an important
factor in the profitability of constructing a project. Safety programs are similar to having
automobile insurance— everyone dreads paying into it them until an accident occurs, then
we are fortunate that we made the investment. It has been noted that a major shift in
priorities must occur to achieve a zero-accident philosophy that the industry has longed
for. Owners, too, must place safety at the front o f their projects. As owners establish the
commitment to construction safety culture, corporate level management of construction
firms will then be forced to establish this same commitment if they want to obtain the
contracts.
Another causal relationship that is critical to the success o f a safety culture on
construction projects is between the owner/client commitment to safety culture and
design professionals commitment to safety culture. As previously mentioned, the
owner/client has the ultimate power to positively or negatively impact the safety culture
on their prospective project. Owners have the ability to select architects and engineers
that emphasize the importance o f safety in their designs— i.e. those design professionals
that consult the CII “Design for Safety Toolbox.” Addressing safety at this level is
believed to have the potential for a positive impact on the safety culture o f the system
because this is the first opportunity that is provided to control potential safety hazards
that may occur once construction as commenced. Historically, architects and engineers
have been reluctant to become entangled in construction safety aspects when designing
projects. Their main reason for avoiding involvement in the safety aspect o f a
construction project is it exposes them to unnecessary liability.

63

The entire project delivery system will need to be completely changed if risk sharing
for safety among all parties is to be obtained. Without this paradigm shift, architects and
engineers will continue to avoid liability associated with construction safety, and
rightfully so. The goal is to create a construction safety culture, and not just make safety
a priority but a shared value. Cultures fail when individuals do not accept the
responsibilities that have been collectively established by the group. The systems
thinking model illustrates a positive causal relationship—-as the owner/client’s
commitment to safety increases, industry design professionals’ commitment to safety
should also increase. If owners make a commitment to safety-oriented designs, and
financially accept the cost o f increased liability for architects and engineers, architects
and engineers will more likely participate in the construction safety culture. This
commitment will, in turn, reinforce management’s commitment to safety.
Management commitment to safety is the foundation to which construction safety is
based upon. No safety program, or any other program for that matter, will be successful
without the full support and commitment o f both corporate management and project-level
management. “A well designed management system can help to reduce incidents along
with the associated hidden costs; increase efficiency; improve productivity, morale, and
quality o f products; and reduce the potential for regulatory citations” (Roughton &
Mercurio, 2002). Although the appropriate starting point for this systems thinking model
is the owner/client’s commitment to safety, the commitment o f management to safety is
the driving force o f the culture. Skeptics o f safety culture question whether or not
management commitment has that much o f an impact on the success o f a safety program.
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It is management’s duty to, not only develop the safety culture which is ideal for its
organization, but to develop one in which implementation comes from active
participation. Active participation o f management provides the motivation for those at
the operational level to participate in the safety program. In my systems thinking model,
there is a positive relationship between the commitment o f corporate and project-level
management. As the commitment o f corporate level management to construction safety
culture o f their organization increase, the commitment o f the project-level management
will also increase. There are many ways that both corporate and project-level
management can demonstrate their commitment visibly to other members o f their system.
Roughton & Mercurio (2002) states some methods that management can utilize to display
their commitment:
•

Getting out where you can be seen, informally or through formal inspections

•

Being accessible

•

Being an example, by knowing and following the rules that employees are
expected to follow

•

Being involved by participating on the workplace safety and health committee

•

Conducting frequent inspections with selected employees

When it comes to safety, management must lead by example. As mentioned before,
management cannot expect its workforce to comply with jobsite safety regulations if they
do not, themselves, display a commitment to those regulations. We often see top level
management walking around construction sites without their PPE. This makes a
statement to the entire organization suggesting that safety is not a priority. For a safety
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culture to exist, the beliefs and values have to he shared among all individuals within that
system. Safety is the responsibility o f everyone in the organization.
There is also a positive causal relationship that exists between corporate-level
management’s commitment to safety culture and the project scheduler’s commitment to
safety culture. As management’s commitment to construction safety culture increases,
project scheduler’s commitment to safety should also increase. One o f the most
important aspects o f any construction project is effective planning and scheduling.
Scheduling impacts all areas o f construction including; safety, costs, productivity,
profitability, etc. Most activities involved in construction pose some kind of risk of
illness and/or injury to workers, but some activities greater than others. Certain activities
that pose increased threats to workers require additional time to perform those activities
safely and efficiently. If safety is taken into consideration during the scheduling phase of
a project and additional time is provided for various activities that are more dangerous,
then workers will be able to work efficiently and cautiously when working. When
projects get behind schedule for various reasons, workers tend to work faster and cut
comers in regards to safe working practices. Effective safety-oriented scheduling is the
solution. Safety is as just as much the responsibility of project schedulers as it is any
other member o f the construction project.
Corporate-level management may also express its commitment to safety culture by
providing the necessary resources to achieve the goals and objectives o f the safety
program. In the systems thinking model there is a positive causal relationship between
corporate management’s commitment to safety culture and their investment on safety
programs. As corporate level management’s commitment to safety increases, the amount
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o f resources that they invest in their safety program will also increase. Resource
investment in safety programs may come in many forms. Management may invest
financial resources in their training programs for both workers and project level
management. Financial investment may be allocated to the hiring o f various safety
professionals i.e. safety managers, safety officers, and administrative support. Also,
safety investment results in the purchase or rental o f modem advanced constmction
equipment that has state-of-the-art safety features.
The systems thinking model indicates a positive causal relationship between safety
investment and various safety resources. As investment in safety increases, the number
of safety professionals hired into the organization increases, in addition to the increase in
the number o f modem, technologically advanced pieces o f construction equipment a
company uses— either owned or rented. It is important to mention that all o f these factors
have begun via management’s commitment to safety. If you have a sufficient number of
safety professionals assigned to a job site this will also increase enforcement of OSHA
regulations on the jobsite. The systems thinking model illustrates that there is a positive
relationship that exists between the number o f safety professionals assigned to a
construction project and enforcement o f OSHA regulations.
To enforce and comply with OSHA regulations, safety professionals will increase its
use o f accident reporting and investigation systems. It is the responsibility o f safety
personnel to establish and maintain a functional reporting and measurement system.
Organizations are required, legally, to report on all accidents that occur during work
performance. However, organizations have a greater need for accident reporting and
investigation systems. “This need is based on the reporting of accidents for insurance
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premium calculation purposes and also as part o f the safety management system to
reduce the occurrence o f accidents by analyzing and reporting on accident causation and
highlighting areas where action is needed” (Rowlinson, 2004). As mentioned before, the
objective o f the reporting system is to not only monitor accident rates, but to identify
accident causes and risk exposures, monitor the effect o f site safety initiatives, and to
estimate the costs o f accidents. Reporting and investigation systems are another means of
checking the safety status o f the organization. Ultimately, as the use o f accident
reporting and investigation systems increase, the system should experience a decrease in
the number of accidents on the construction project. This negative causal relationship is
illustrated in the systems thinking model. Safety investment is another way that
management’s commitment to construction safety culture is visibly demonstrated.
There is probably no better way to provide the knowledge o f safe working practices
and hazard recognition than through effective training programs. Training programs
should be provided for both management and labor. Training programs will vary
throughout various organizations according to their needs and objectives. However,
workers should be provided, at a minimum, an OSHA 10-hour training course in safety
and jobsite hazard recognition or equivalent. Many construction companies require that
their management level employees receive the 30-hour OSHA safety training or
equivalent. As mentioned earlier in the text, there are three common types o f training;
induction training, refresher training, and ongoing training. Management can
demonstrate their commitment to safety culture by paying for the various types of
training as hours worked. This will emphasize to workers that safety is the main
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objective and the organization is willingly to make a financial investment in insuring the
safety of its workforce.
Although safety is the responsibility o f all within the system, safety should still be
reiterated with the presence o f safety personnel. The investment in safety personnel
including safety managers, officers, and administration demonstrates that an organization
is willing to increase efforts to insure the success o f their safety program. Implementing
any program and especially developing a safety culture is a difficult task to achieve. It is
a job that should be given special attention by individuals who have been trained or
educated in safety. “Training is more complicated than telling or showing someone how
to perform a task. Training is the transfer o f specific knowledge to trainees in such a way
that the trainees accept and use the knowledge in the performance o f their jobs.”
(Roughton and Mercurio, 2002). In the system thinking model, as the number o f safety
personnel increases, the amount o f training including induction, refresher, and ongoing
training will also increase. There is a positive causal relationship between the number o f
safety personnel that management has invested in with the amount o f training that the
workforce receives from its employer.
Training o f our workforce cannot be emphasized enough. It is much less expensive
to provide workers the necessary training they need to perform tasks safely and
efficiently than to pay medical bills as a result o f injuries caused by lack of training and
experience. Lack o f training has been attributed to the cause o f many accidents that have
been cited as “human error,” in which an individual’s negligent actions were the primary
cause o f the accident. Refresher training is one method o f improving human error in the
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construction industry. Refresher training reinforces and reiterates the safe practices and
precautions that will increase workers’ safety and well-being on construction sites.
In the systems thinking model, human error has a positive causal relationship with
accidents. As human error action on the job site increases, the number o f accidents will
also increase. The same positive relationship also exists with a decrease in human
error— as human error decrease, the number o f accidents caused will likely experience a
decrease. In the systems thinking model training has positive causal relationships with
both safety knowledge o f workers and their commitment to the safety culture o f their
organization. There is no question that employee training significantly enhances the level
o f safety knowledge of workers. In the model, as training o f the workforce increases, the
average safety knowledge of the workforce and their commitment to the safety culture
also increase. As a result of both corporate and project management level’s visible
commitment to safety, those individuals at the operational level will develop an inherent
commitment to safety. When management “sets the tone” by visibly demonstrating their
commitment, workers will be motivated to follow or practice the same culture o f the
organization.
The next major causal relationships that exist within this systems thinking model of
construction safety culture revolves around the factor ‘productivity.’ Acquiring the
proper, modern equipment for employees to perform tasks efficiently and safely is
another major demonstration o f management’s commitment to the safety o f their
employees. As management’s commitment to safety increase, so does the amount of
resources it invests in modem, technologically advanced equipment. Equipment has a
tremendous impact on the safety status o f an organization. The safety o f the most
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competent, safety-focused individuals can be compromised with the use o f out-dated
tools and equipment.
Over the years, the manufacturers o f construction equipment and tools have shifted its
focus not only on increased productivity, but also increased safety o f the individuals who
use them. For example, cranes are being designed with hi-defmition monitoring systems
which increase visibility of workers and activities that are occurring below. In addition
to monitoring systems, anti-two block systems have become standard safety equipment
on cranes. Cranes are just one example o f the many, major advancements that equipment
manufacturers have made to increase safety efforts in the construction industry. The
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the governing voice o f standards for
consumer goods in the United States has also increased its’ standards for participating
organizations to ensure the health and safety o f workers that utilize the products. In
addition to safety, a major advantage o f technologically-advanced equipment is that it can
increase productivity on the job site. There is also a positive causal relationship between
the number o f pieces of modem equipment a company uses (owns or rents) and the
amount o f productivity that is achieved on the construction project. In addition to safety,
modem tools and equipment are designed for increased productivity. It is important to
point out, that the increase in new state-of-the art equipment will also require workers to
receive training on safe, effective operations o f the newly, acquired equipment.
Productivity plays a major part in other causal relationships in this systems thinking
model
In most cases safety has never been the overall, driving principle (priority) o f the
construction industry. Typically, management overemphasizes production, cost, and
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even quality over safety (McSween, 2003). As previously stated, the reason that safety is
not the overall priority of the construction industry is because safety is considered to be
an overhead cost. It is an activity that does not directly yield profits. Most construction
employers fail to realize the impact that safety can have on productivity. Workers
commitment to safety is the result o f training, experience level, and overall commitment
of management itself. When workers embrace the safety culture o f an organization they
will not only become committed to achieving safety-related goals and objectives, but all
organizational goals including productivity. When workers are confident about their
safety and well-being in their work environment it is believed that they will work more
efficiently to accomplish tasks.
The goal o f any organization is to get the greatest performance from its workforce as
possible. Often, workers are pressured by management to achieve high and sometimes
unrealistic goals and milestones. The pressure to perform faster and produce more often
causes workers to “cut comers” during activities to make up time. Because workers
generally perform the same tasks daily they get complacent in regards to safety. They
focus more on productivity, but neglect safety because they feel overconfident that their
actions (cutting comers) will not lead to injury. The systems thinking model illustrates
the negative causal relationship that exists between productivity and job pressure. As
productivity increase, job pressure from upper level management to produce more
decreases, and vice versa. As a result, another causal relationship exists— there is a
positive causal relationship that exists between job pressure and accidents. The systems
thinking model illustrates that as job pressure on workers by upper management
increases, accidents occurring on job site will also increase, and vice versa. O f course.
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the goal is to achieve that latter—job pressure decrease and accidents decrease. There is
a major difference between working fast and working efficient. When workers
experience pressure from management they tend to work faster. Failure to tie-off and
working without necessary personal protective equipment are two common examples of
“cutting comers” that workers fail to perform to make up time on the jobsite.
The final relationship that exists in this loop of the system thinking diagram is
between accidents and labor commitment to safety. The relationship that exists between
these two factors is negative. The systems thinking model illustrates that as the number
of accidents on a construction site decreases, labor/worker commitment to the safety
culture o f the organization increases. A decrease in accidents or zero-accident job site
reinforces the notion that the organizational commitment to construction safety culture
has paid off.
Throughout this thesis I have made references on how to achieve a construction
safety culture. A zero-accident job site is a likely indication that a safety culture exists
within that organization. Decreased accidents means that everyone in the organization,
specifically the workers, have performed their tasks safely and in a manner which has
prevented injury to themselves and others in the work environment.
The variable ‘accidents’ is also related to other important variables in the systems
thinking model. There is a positive causal relationship that exists between accidents and
an organization’s experience modification rate. The other positive causal relationship
exists between accidents and OSHA fines. Finally, a negative causal relationship exists
between accidents and public perception.
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An organization’s EMR is directly impacted by the number o f accidents that occurs in
that company in a certain time period. As mentioned previously, the EMR o f an
organization is a comparison o f that organization’s workers compensation claim to other
organization o f the similar size. Many accidents on the jobsite result in workers
compensation claims. According to the number o f accidents an organization has
experienced, an experience modification rating is assigned. The experience modification
rate determines the annual insurance premium that companies must pay to insure their
operations. The systems thinking model illustrates that as the number o f accidents an
organization experiences increases, the company’s experience modification rate also
increase. As managers, we strive to reduce our organizations experience modification
rate to reduce costs o f operation. The average experience modification rate is 1.0.
Falling under this number for example, an EMR o f .80, means that the organization has
an above average rating in regards to safety. Anything above 1.0 indicates that an
organization is above its industry counterparts in regards to safety. The latter indicates a
need for an effective safety program. If the EMR increases, the overall costs o f operating
the construction business will also increase. This positive causal relationship is
illustrated in the systems thinking diagram.
Accidents that result in injury and/or death typically involve penalties issued by
OSHA. The systems thinking model illustrates the positive relationship between
accidents and OSHA fines. The Occupational Safety and Health Act o f 1970 placed the
responsibility o f providing a safe and healthy working environment on employers.
Failure to comply with OSHA regulations results in fines. The following table provides a
good representation o f the severity o f the safety problem for the construction industry.
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The Table 6 presents the total amount of violations and the amount of money collected in
fines in 2002.

Table 6. OSHA Violations and Penalties in 2002 (OSHA, 2002)
OSHA's Federal Inspections by Type of Violation (Fiscal Year 2002)
No. of
Violations
Percent Type
Current Penalties ($)
54,842
Serious
48,312,043
70%
Other-than20,749
Serious
2,145,151
26%
1,969
416
231
226
78,433

2.50%
0.50%
0.30%
0.30%
100%

Repeat
Willful
Failure to Abate
State Inspections
Total

7,710,736
11,799,539
597,301
2,268,508
72,827,278

In 2002 alone, OSHA issued citations for 78, 433 violation totaling $72,827,278 in
fines. Whether employers spend the money on an effective safety program or spend
money in fines resulting from accidents, the fact is that safety will impact the overall
costs an organization, one way or another.
Public perception plays a rather unique and important role in this entire systems
thinking model. In the systems thinking model, there is a negative causal relationship
between accidents and public perception o f the construction organization or system. The
model illustrates that as the number o f accidents increase, there is a decrease in the
public’s perception o f that construction system including the client/owner and the general
contractor. Image is everything. No matter how spectacular a project or structure may
be, the poor safety culture of the system could destroy the public’s perception o f the
project and all parties involved including the owner/client and the contractors.
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Public’s perception o f an owner/client and contractors may be a driving force for
making a commitment to construction safety culture. No organization wants to be the
target o f bad press. Public perception can play a role in the financial interests of
organizations. For example, if it is publicly known that a contractor has subpar
performance with respect to safety it may be difficult to pre-qualify for various projects.
The average owner will not carry a company with a poor safety history on the ownercontrolled insurance program (OCIP) because these companies are a liability to the
owner. Implications of poor safety culture exist for the owner as well. Also, if
owners/clients have a poor safety history on their projects this will affect the cost of
insurance premiums. Public’s perception of the owner may also affect the success o f the
business once it has been constructed and open for operation. Therefore, in response to
public perception, both owners and corporate level management must make a full
commitment to the construction safety culture of the system. The systems thinking
model illustrates a positive causal relationship between public perception and the
owner/client commitment to construction safety culture. It is important to point at that
the relationship between these two variables may also exist as a negative causal
relationship. As public perception o f an owner/client or project goes down, the owner’s
commitment to construction safety culture may increase.
Whether the relationship between public perception and owner commitment to safety
exist as negative or positive, the relationship results in the owner/client increasing its
standards and criteria for prequalifying contractors to construct their projects. The
systems thinking model illustrates the positive relationship between the owner/client
commitment to construction safety culture and contractor selection criteria. As the
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owner’s commitment to construction safety culture increases there is an increase in the
number o f contractor selection criteria that the owner uses to screen or pre-qualify
potential contractors. The vision o f safety must be shared by all parties involved in the
construction project. Adversarial relationships often exist between the owner/client and
contractors during the construction process. These relationships tend to improve
sometimes only after the owner and contractor have multiple business ventures. To
achieve a safety culture, these differences between owners and contractors must be set
aside immediately to accomplish a more important goal o f a zero-accident construction
project. Safety is a team process; owners and contractors cannot exist as separate entities.
In every team each individual is assigned responsibilities that are critical to the overall
success o f the team. Owners and contractors must share the same vision for success o f
safety culture. Owners must have a stringent prequalification/screening process in which
they are able to determine if the shared vision of safety culture exists in prospective
contractors. This same process must be repeated when general contractors select
potential sub-contractors.
In the model, there is no definite ending point. When systems thinking models are
converted into system dynamics models it is important to run the model long enough to
see the dynamics o f the problem or issue play out.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This systems thinking model provides an understanding for the interconnectedness o f
the many factors requisite in achieving a construction safety culture. The ultimate goal of
construction safety culture is to reduce and/or eliminate the number o f accidents in the
industry, improve the productivity o f our workforces, build more positive business
images, reduce cost associated with accidents, produce highly trained, competent
workers, and select more safety-conscious subcontractors, vendors, and design personnel.
This study has revealed that the major underlying cause o f failure o f safety culture in the
construction industry results from management’s (both corporate and project level) lack
o f commitment to safety and the enforcement o f its safety program. O f course,
construction safety culture may not be limited to just these variables that have been
presented in this thesis. Admittedly, this model may not result in a “one-size fits all”
solution to achieving construction safety culture. Creating systems thinking models
entails that we are predicting the behavior o f a system over time. This systems thinking
model o f construction safety culture provides a vivid image o f those factors that are
critical to the establishment and maintenance o f construction safety; however, no model
will ever be 100% accurate. Kim (1992) states that “drawing out future behavior means
taking a risk—the risk o f being wrong. The fact is, any projection o f the future will be
wrong, but by making it explicit, we can test our assumptions and uncover
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inconsistencies that may otherwise never get surfaced.” When making predictions,
especially on the behavior of complex systems we run the risk o f having some
inaccuracies; however the systems thinking approach does provide one guaranteed
benefit— assessment.
An assessment tool is critical to the success and maintenance o f any program. The
goal o f a safety program assessment is to ensure that the goals and objectives o f the
program are being met, and to determine which criteria, procedures, and/or practices may
be lacking and in need o f improvement. All-in-all, an assessment tool serves as a “reality
check” o f our beliefs and speculations about the status o f our organization’s safety
program. McSween (2003) provides several objectives o f safety assessments including:
(1) identifying existing efforts and develop a plan that builds on these efforts, (2)
incorporate input from key personnel, (3) identifying high risk areas, (4) identifying
training needs, and (5) build management support for implementation. To assess the
status o f a safety culture within a system, an organization must determine the collective
attitudes o f all employees (both management and operational levels) about the various
factors that make up that system. This is best achieved by performing confidential
questionnaires (perception survey), interviews, focus group meetings, and visits to assess
workplace conditions and possible causes to incidents. Because safety is such a problem
for the construction industry, it is best to have a system which allows the system to be
continually assessed; not only after an incident has occurred, but also when we feel that
the program is performing at it best. Historically, organizations have taken the reactive
approach to safety implementation. Only after accidents have occurred do they attempt
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to figure out what aspect of their safety program has failed. Data supports the notion that
the reactive approach to construction safety has been unsuccessful.
It is recommended that this system thinking model o f construction safety culture be
converted to a system dynamics model to serve as an assessment tool. The benefit o f the
systems thinking/system dynamics approach to construction safety culture is that it
identifies system errors and allows problems to be addressed before accidents occur.
Hence, system dynamics is a proactive approach to solving problems. In order to convert
the mental model that has been created in this thesis into a system dynamics model, we
must take the information from the causal relationships and apply parameter values to
them that have been taken from various sources, i.e. statistical analysis o f time series
data. The numerical data may then be fed into modeling and simulation programs, such
as Vensim, to simulate the behavior o f the various factors within the system. The
benefits that system dynamics may have on safety and the construction industry, as a
whole, may be endless. The ultimate benefit is that if we, as managers, have a tool that
provides information on potential failures within our safety programs we can direct our
attention to that source that requires improvement or change all together. Corrective
action to prevent further injuries and/or fatalities may be initiated before they become
reality. Systems thinking and system dynamics are appropriate tools for understanding
the interconnectedness o f those factors that must exist to create and maintain a safety
culture in complex, construction systems. Past research has studied safety in various
ways that have seemed less successful in determining why this problem has plagued the
industry for far too long. Systems thinking illustrates that all aspects o f construction
safety culture have failed because management has failed to make and demonstrate a full
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commitment. Making safety the so-called

Priority” has proved only to be a catchy

slogan on company banners. To reduce injuries and fatalities in the construction
industry, we must make a shift from safety being our “ 1®' Priority” to our way of life—
our culture.
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